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United States v. AMR Corp.: Non-Traditional
Cost Measures and Expanding Predatory
Pricing Exposure
Robert Bell, Lee Greenfield, Veronica Kayne, William Kolasky, Jim Lowe, Doug
Melamed, Thomas Mueller, and Ali Stoeppelwerth
Abstract
Historically, industries with low average variable costs (AVC) have been as a prac-
tical matter largely immune from predatory pricing claims. The reason is simple.
Predatory pricing claims require the plaintiff to establish, among other things,
that the defendant priced below an appropriate measure of cost. Because marginal
costs are notoriously difficult to measure, courts have commonly compared the
defendant’s prices to AVC (total costs that vary with output/units of output). Con-
sequently, in industries where average variable costs are very low, plaintiffs are
unlikely to be able to prove that defendants have priced below AVC, even when
defendants have drastically slashed prices. Airlines are a classic example of such
an industry.
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Historically, industries with low average variable costs (AVC) have been as a practical matter largely immune
from predatory pricing claims.  The reason is simple.  Predatory pricing claims require the plaintiff to establish,
among other things, that the defendant priced below an appropriate measure of cost.  Because marginal costs are
notoriously difficult to measure, courts have commonly compared the defendant’s prices to AVC (total costs that
vary with output/units of output).  Consequently, in industries where average variable costs are very low, plaintiffs
are unlikely to be able to prove that defendants have priced below AVC, even when defendants have drastically
slashed prices.  Airlines are a classic example of such an industry.
A recent appeals court decision may give companies with low AVC new reason to worry about predatory
pricing claims.  In United States v. AMR Corp., No. 01-3202 (10th Cir. July 3, 2003), the Tenth Circuit accepted in
principle the Justice Department’s argument that, in some predatory pricing cases, measurements other than AVC
that more directly reflect the specific incremental costs associated with alleged predation may be the most appro-
priate benchmark of the defendant’s costs.
The Decision in AMR
Between 1995 and 1997, several low cost carriers
entered certain airline routes between Dallas/Fort Worth
Airport and other cities that American Airlines serves and
undercut American’s fares.  American responded to the
new competition by lowering prices and increasing
capacity by adding flights or using larger planes, in both
cases drawing planes from other purportedly profitable
routes.  In each instance, American’s conduct allegedly
forced the low cost carrier to either move its operations to
different routes or cease competing altogether.  After the
low cost carriers had exited the routes, American generally
reduced capacity and raised prices to levels roughly
comparable to those before the low-fare competitors
entered.  The government alleged that American designed
its actions to drive the low cost carriers from the markets
and, more broadly, build a reputation for predatory pricing
to defend its monopoly on other routes between its Dallas/
Fort Worth hub and other cities.  The district court granted
AMR’s (American’s parent) motion for summary judg-
ment on all antitrust claims.
To understand the government’s argument in AMR it
is helpful to recall the purpose of comparing price and
cost.  Doing so helps the court to determine whether the
defendant made sales that were unprofitable and thus
made no economic sense apart from their anticompetitive
purpose.  It also helps to ensure that predatory pricing
claims do not (perversely) chill the very bare-fisted price
rivalry that the antitrust laws are designed to preserve.  As
noted above, courts have widely adopted the defendant’s
AVC in the relevant market as a proxy for marginal cost.
The Justice Department argued that applying an AVC
test — measuring variable costs over the defendant’s
entire market output — was inappropriate here because
the Department’s claim was directed against well-defined,
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measurable incremental conduct, namely adding capacity
while cutting prices.  The Department therefore asked the
court to forgo market-wide AVC and instead measure the
costs specifically associated with American’s capacity
additions.  According to the Justice Department, relying
on market-wide AVC would obscure American’s predatory
strategy:  although American may have priced above its
market-wide AVC, an analysis comparing the incremental
revenues and costs of its capacity additions would have
shown a loss.
The government argued that since American’s cost of
adding capacity exceeded the revenues generated by the
capacity additions, its conduct would have been economi-
cally irrational but for its exclusionary effect.  According
to the government, the district court erroneously believed
that an airline’s cost of serving additional passengers is
always close to its route-wide AVC.  In essence, the
Justice Department argued that the proper measurement of
cost is that associated with bringing more or bigger planes
on to the route; and the district court erred by holding the
amount of capacity on the route as a given, fixed cost and
classify as variable only those costs directly associated
with putting one more passenger on a flight (i.e., a bag of
peanuts and a soft drink).
Citing recent scholarship challenging the premise that
predatory pricing schemes are implausible and irrational,
the Tenth Circuit said it approached the predatory pricing
claim with “caution” rather than “incredulity.”  It accepted
the government’s basic legal theory that measures of cost
other than AVC may be necessary properly to evaluate
predatory pricing claims, although it nonetheless affirmed
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
The court found that sole reliance on market-wide AVC
might, indeed, obscure the nature of a predatory scheme.
The court also made clear, however, that when a
plaintiff seeks to use marginal cost as the relevant mea-
sure, the calculation of marginal cost must be accurate and
reliable in the circumstances of the case.  On the particular
facts in AMR, the Tenth Circuit found that the Department
had failed to offer an alternative test that accurately
measured incremental costs.  Specifically, according to the
court, the four alternative tests that the government
offered were invalid as a matter of law either because they
lumped fixed with marginal costs, adopted an impermis-
sible short-run profit-maximization test, or included
variable costs attributable to American’s broader opera-
tions that were not specifically associated with adding
capacity to the routes at issue.  The court’s rejection of the
government’s tests reinforces why AVC, rather than
marginal cost, has been the customary touchstone for
predatory pricing analysis:  plaintiffs trying to rely on
marginal costs to prove predatory pricing face difficult —
and sometimes insoluble — conceptual and practical
problems.
Implications of AMR
AMR does not signal a change in the basic law of
predatory pricing.  Indeed, it reconfirms the basic premise
that marginal cost — rather than the more common proxy
of AVC — may be an appropriate cost measure in preda-
tory pricing cases.  This option was left open by the
Supreme Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), when it
declined to endorse AVC as the only appropriate cost
measure.  The Tenth Circuit’s opinion does suggest,
however, that post-Chicago School economic scholarship
may be influencing courts to take a less hostile view
towards predatory pricing claims than that reflected in
Brooke Group and other cases.  More particularly, AMR’s
focus on the potential decision making advantages of
using marginal cost rather than AVC in some circum-
stances could have far-reaching consequences.
As long as courts rely only on AVC, firms with low
AVC in the relevant market (such as airlines and software
firms) are virtually immune from predatory pricing claims.
In light of AMR, however, even firms with very low AVC
should be more cautious and examine proposed new
pricing schemes carefully.  Of course, plaintiffs still face
the difficult challenge of devising tests to measure these
incremental costs accurately, without including fixed costs
or other variable costs not attributable to the specific
conduct in question.  Nevertheless, after AMR, even very
low AVC is no longer a guarantee that a defendant will
prevail in a predatory pricing action.
Please contact us if you would like further informa-
tion about the AMR case or would like information about
any other issue of US or foreign antitrust or competition
law.
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